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PREFACE: 
SOME IDEALS FOR LA WYERS 
Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
When your editors asked me to write this preface, they suggested 
.hat I might present an overview of the Supreme Judicial Court's 
vork during the 1975-1976 court year. I know from past experience 
)f the extraordinary overview that is presented in these volumes by 
jour editors; they need little help of that kind from me. For that rea-
son I turned to their alternative suggestion: my thoughts as to the role 
lawyers should play in improving the quality of American justice. 
Obedient to that theme, I suggest some ideals for our profession, 
ideals of special service to the cause of improving the quality of jus-
tice. 
In beginning this theme, my first thoughts are of lawyers and cor-
ruption. Corruption concerning lawyers in the highest places, in gov-
ernment and in giant corporations. Corruption which is anything but 
subtle. Corruption in the form of bribery, larceny and in the criminal 
violation of individual rights. I refuse to accept the popular canard 
that lawyers are more likely to be corrupt than other persons. On the 
contrary, I make an educated guess that the mine-run of lawyers, in 
this profession which has of all professions the maximum of tempta-
tion and opportunity for wrongdoing, is probably a cut above the av-
erage in morality. Nevertheless, I recognize that the special privileges 
which inhere in the lawyer's license to practice are accompanied by a 
special duty of self-policing. 
How may we serve? I suggest the first answer. Wherever we prac-
tice law we should support a vigorous bar-discipline structure; fi-
nanced, not by the ~axpayers, but by assessment upon the bar. The 
structure will be readily accessible to the public, and may include 
laymen as well as lawyers. It will require constant vigilance lest it be-
come moribund. It will, aggressively and without partiality, identify 
and curb the incompetents and the charlatans of the profession. We 
should also recognize a special duty to support a judicial-discipline 
structure that will aggressively pursue public complaints of venality 
upon the bench. But it will go farther, and reach such things as judi-
cial incivility and sloth, if any exists. And in all these things, we should 
not 'tolerate in ourselves or other attorneys a conspiracy of silence at 
the bar, out of false loyalty to any who have themselves been disloyal 
to their oaths. 
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Next, we would do well to consider the widespread abuse of the ad-
versary process. How may we serve well in joinin a profession in 
which some members are said to make litigation an nd in itself? The 
lawyer's most malignant fault is what Chief Justice urger has called 
contentiousness. Judge Learned Hand said, "I must ay that, as a liti-
gant, I should dread a law suit beyond almost anyt ing else short of 
sickness and death." Attorneys in large numbers see more interested 
in the complexity and prolongation of the dispute t an in its resolu-
tion, and all to the great profit of the advocates. 
The courts become clogged partly because of the overreaching of 
counsel, as they spin out their causes. The "simplifi d" rules of civil 
procedure, now almost universally applied in all Am rican courts, are 
abused beyond the predictions of even their most essimistic critics. 
The rules of discovery, by means of endless de ositions and in-
terrogatories, produce mountains of interlocutory product. Small 
wonder that, despite little access to backlogged and ammed jury ses-
sions, the attorneys of the firms' litigation departme ts may whistle at 
their work. 
I listen with respect, and some dismay, to those ho say that the 
greatest abuse of the system occurs in those most omplex of cases: 
antitrust suits and class actions. More than 5,000 clas actions are now 
pending in the federal courts, and the gates are simil rly beginning to 
open wide in the state courts. Interlocutory proceedi gs are abusively 
accumulated. We know, of course, that consumer cla s actions may be 
brought by the attorney general of a state, but they re more likely to 
be brought by private counsel, bringing suit for all ffected consum-
ers, known and unknown to counsel. And, knowi g something of 
human nature, we recognize that it is true that ma y consumer class 
actions and antitrust suits are not meritorious; that s me are instituted 
to wring settlements from corporations under threa of long and in-
credibly expensive litigation; that the recovered am unts due to the 
consumers go unclaimed in large percentages, an escheat to the 
state; that the most certain element of all is that lar e attorneys' fees 
·are involved. 
Nevertheless, we are disturbed that the Supreme Court, probably 
induced by the massive flood of litigation which thre tens to inundate 
the court system, has with recent decisions restricte citizen access to 
the courts and made citizen suits even more financial y difficult. 
Some of us are disturbed because we believe that state and federal 
administrative regulation of corporations has long si ce demonstrated 
its limitations. Criminal and civil procedures by the government, 
aimed at control of corporate conduct, seldom en ugh seem to be 
brought or to come to fruition. Thus, in our com pIe society the class 
action is one of the few legal remedies for the lowl . We decide that 
since the courts apparently are too far committed 0 the ending of 
such proceedings, then recourse to the Congress an state legislatures 
is indicated. At the same time, in a flash of clear vis on, we recognize 
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that one of the threats to the future of successful and continued citi-
zen action in the courts may be the greed, unfairness and poor judg-
ment of some attorneys for the citizens. The citizens' problems, caused 
by corporations running out of control, may be exacerbated by attor-
neys also running unchecked. 
And so we may decide that we may serve well in our use of the 
courts, and in our refusal to abuse the processes of the law. We can 
apply moral judgment to assure that litigation without merit is not 
pursued or furthered by us; that we do not feed and prey upon con-
gestion and delay in the courts, thereby compounding a festering so-
cial evil. We can assure that the worthless suit does not acquire a value 
by the process of prolonged and expensive litigation, which in turn 
may be converted into substantial attorneys' fees, and settlements 
achieved solely by the harassment of litigation. Additionally, we can 
despise Dickens' rule of jarndycf! v. jarndyce, which has nurtured so 
much distrust for our profession. We can aim at just and prompt 
resolution of disputes, wherever possible, rather than to adopt ex-
tended contention as a profitable end in itself. In this way we can as-
sure that the courts are not further clogged by any abuses fostered by 
us and that the forum to that extent may be more readily available to 
the deserving litigant. We can do all within our power to make the 
courts more rather than less accessible to the underprivileged through 
public and private litigation. 
In the same spirit, if we are legal advisors to corporations we can do 
what we can to bring moral and ethical principles to bear upon their 
business practices, to the end that justice will be assured without the 
need for litigation. 
But these resolutions, valid as they are, may lead us to more 
troublesome considerations. For we know that few citizens have access 
to the legal system, whether to defend their constitutional and statut-
ory rights or to advance their causes. Legislative and administrative 
forums, as well as the courts, are available to very few on issues of 
housing, health care, taxes, government devices, occupational and en-
vironmental disease, corporate abuses and the legal industry itself. 
Where government neglect exists, individual initiative is needed, but is 
wanting. Funding, public and private, for public interest law programs 
has been grossly inadequate, and uncertain in duration, and at times 
has been used to promote the causes of lawyers rather than the dis-
position of cases. And so we may recognize and support the need for 
the award of attorneys' fees (presently denied) for private litigants 
whose lawsuits confer substantial public benefits. At the same time we 
recognize the danger of abuses of such a system, abuses we have 
already mentioned as related to class actions. 
But in terms of any personal commitment to our professional obli-
gations, the assurance of public support for the representation of citi-
zens is welcome but not entirely relevant. Listen to the challenge of 
Professor Llewellyn delivered in 1933: "For the men of law are a 
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monopoly, and monopoly is subject to regulation. The ground for 
monopoly is that it makes possible better service; this holds of the bar. 
The condition of monopoly is that it serve; this does not hold of the 
bar. If it were gas or transportation these men of law were furnishing, 
the. established policy and rule would be service to ~ll comers on de-
mand and no refusal, at fixed and reasonable rat s, by State com-
pulsion. The bar, man by man or firm by firm, se their own fees, 
choose among clients, and leave the bulk of needed service 
unperformed-the poor man's case. The bar purport moreover to 
exist as a profession. A profession is a line of work in which, so long 
as he who professes it can eat, his job is service. Law~'s a profession in 
theory, and a monopoly in fact; a monopoly not m rely by force of 
skill and brain but established and maintained by I w. Only through 
lawyers can the layman win in fact the rights the law purports to give 
h· " 1m. 
Consider the noble phrase "pro bono publico" (for the common 
good)! As we read Llewellyn's words, we know (mor~ than forty years 
later) that almost all of the representation of ind~p,ents accused of 
crime is funded by the taxpayer, and that "pro bono' legal services in 
both criminal and noncriminal litigation are virtually nonexistent. For 
instance, we learn that only a few law firms in the great legal centers 
of America regularly provide any pro bono lawyer-fours. We learn, 
also, that young and outstanding lawyers applying to these firms have, 
perhaps because of overcrowding in the job market ceased even in-
quiring if the hiring firm provides pro bono service to the community. 
How can we serve? We may have reached one more compelling an-
swer to our inquiry. To the extent that we, our firm, or our bar asso-
ciation can fairly be expected to do so, we should ~rovide pro bono 
publico programs-those programs which are sham fully nonexistent 
today. 
Closely related is the privilege of the lawyer and his bar associations 
to educate the public (in the schools and wherever else the public will 
listen) as to the operation of our courts, particular}y as to constitu-
tional rights. I 
In a very few years we have reached new heights lin the protection 
of constitutional rights in our criminal courts. But now also there is a 
great sense of apprehension and foreboding among many people, 
largely because of the frightening increase in crimes of violence. 
Widespread distrust of the courts in their administiation of criminal 
justice is expressed. As a result, there is a clear dan er that there will 
be inroads and abridgements of our right of free s eech and assem-
bly, of our right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, of 
our privilege against self-incrimination, our right to counsel and our 
right to the equal protection of the laws and to due process of law in 
all its forms. This may happen by federal and state ~egiSlation within 
constitutional limits, or even by constitutional amend ents. The more 
likely possibility is that it may happen on a case-by-ca e basis by many, 
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many decisions, not only in Washington but in the municipal and 
county courthouses of the nation. The local court has no power to 
change the rule of constitutional law but we cannot ignore the fact 
that the trial judge makes the subsidiary findings which, in many or 
perhaps most cases, are determinative of the result on the constitu-
tional issue. 
Next we turn to perhaps the most subtle consideration of all: that of 
the influence of the lawyer and his bar assocations in political policy. 
Strangely, by far the greatest force by lawyers in this direction is 
through the judicial process. What I speak of is the phenomenon 
which sees many courts in our country exercising control in a manner 
usually reserved to the executive and legislative branches. This has oc-
curred because, as the constitutional or statutory rights of the in-
dividual against his government are more and more clearly defined, it 
is more and more frequently demonstrated that citizens are being de-
nied their statutory or constitutional rights by government. 
What are some of the results when a citizen can show a court that 
he is not receiving his true entitlement from the executive or legisla-
tive branches? It can result in a judge making the decisions that ordi-
narily a president, a governor, the Congress or the state legislatures 
would make-including decisions as to the expenditure of public 
funds, and the day-to-day operations of public agencies or institutions. 
The courts may make these rulings as to prisons, hospitals, civil ser-
vice, mental institutions, welfare funds, or a multitude of other gov-
ernmental functions. It follows that the courts are making orders as to 
the use of part of the pUblic purse without regard to the whole of the 
public purse or other competing public obligations. They are allocat-
ing part of the public funds with no duty or knowledge as to the de-
mands upon the total funds. This, in the interest of orderly govern-
ment, is not good business if long continued. 
It has been said that the effect of judicial assumption of these re-
sponsibilities can be that the legislature and the executive will refrain 
from serious discussion and decisive action with the political risk-
taking which responsibility imposes. When the decisions are difficult, 
there is always the temptation to avoid confronting them, to let that 
responsibility pass to others. Even where there is the possibility for 
legislative and executive resolve, the freezing effect of the constitu-
tional rule imposed by the courts may frustrate an effective response 
by these institutions. The most important consequence of all of con-
tinued judicial intrusion, necessary though it may be, is best stated by 
asking this question: if such a trend continues and increases, what is 
the effect upon our democratic and constitutional processes? 
The process, of course, calls for judicial restraint; the judge should 
act in such matters only in cases of clear necessity. But I know of no 
judge, federal or state, who gladly or hastily exerts himself in what is 
ordinarily legislative or executive functions; nevertheless, he has no 
choice when the citizen's constitutional or statutory rights are ne-
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glected by the government, and when relief can be lafforded only by 
court order and court supervision. The greater patt of the solution 
lies in more vigilant attention by the legislative and efecutive branches 
to the constitutional and statutory rights of all persons. In this process 
of vigilance an informed citizenry may have a controlling influence. It 
is easy to bring to mind examples from several st~tes where public 
outcry brought about reform of prisons and other institutions. 
The opportunity and duty of the bar is obvious: tol influence legisla-
tive and executive departments toward the full performance of their 
duties. But the voice of the lawyer is a weak one in pplitical matters. It 
was not always that way. In 1830, de Toqueville said of the American 
lawyer: "As the lawyers form the only enlighteneq class whom the 
people do not mistrust, they are naturally called upob to occupy most 
of the public stations. They fill the legislative assemblt·es and are at the 
head of the administration. They consequently exerc se a powerful in-
fluence upon the formation of the law and upon its execution." And 
in 1845 Rufus Choate, the advocate, added these wgrds, "It has been 
the office of the American lawyers of my day to interpret, administer 
and maintain the constitutions of the country. They tpereby 'shared in 
the dignity of founders of states, of restorers of states, of preservers 
of states. Because we are lawyers, we are statesmen. We are by profes-
sion statesmen. And who may measure the value of this department 
of public duty?' " 
Not a word of de Toqueville's or Choate's apprai$als hold true to-
day! Less than a century after de Toqueville spoke, Justice Brandeis 
identified the political default of the bar in these '-fords: "It is true 
that at the present time the lawyer does not hold that position with 
the people that he held fifty years ago, but the rea~on is not, in my 
opinion, lack of opportunity. It is because, instead of holding a posi-
tion of independence between the wealthy and the r.eople, prepared 
to curb the excesses of either, the able lawyers have to a great extent 
allowed themselves to become an adjunct of the great corporations 
and have neglected their obligations to use their powers for the pro-
tection of the people." 
The default is even more clearly defined today. Iq the last two de-
cades, the number of lawyer legislators has declined by about a third 
in the state legislatures. The bar is barely heard as I to constitutional 
problems of the cities; not even heard as to a matter like prison re-
form, which of all things might seem to be a sPFcial concern of 
lawyers. 
And so we identify another way to serve. We knpw that big gov-
ernment, like big business, at times and places is runlning out of con-
trol. The rights of individuals may be protected by petition to the 
judiciary, if necessary, but the country will be better sfrved by political 
activism, of a kind now widely neglected among lawyers. Activism in 
the legislature, as legislative counsel, as counsel iln executive de-
partments of government, or more likely as participaht in political ac-
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tion groupS. Only in that way can social necessity and the democratic 
process both be permanently well served. I suggest that anarchy and 
revolution are the product-in places such as Beirut and Belfast-of 
two things: long-standing injustice to many people and an absence of 
articulate, morally upright leadership. In training and in powers of 
persuasion, and hopefully in moral principles, the lawyer is especially 
suited for such leadership. The critical question is whether, in signifi-
cant numbers, lawyers are willing to yield their role as prosperous 
spectators, as accused by Brandeis and Llewellyn. In particular, the 
question is urgent as related to the resurgence of racial confrontation 
in the nation. 
Finally, I should like to bring these comments into perspective by 
observing that there is a large measure of idealism in a great number 
of America's lawyers. The noble attributes that I have listed are proof 
of this; they present themselves to me because I have seen many 
judges and lawyers work unselfishly in these directions. It is their 
ideals of service which we must propagate. 
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